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Philosophers now seem to agree that frequentism is an untenable strategy to explain
the meaning of probabilities. Nevertheless, I want to revive frequentism, and I will
do so by grounding probabilities on typicality in the same way as the thermodynamic
arrow of time can be grounded on typicality within statistical mechanics. This account,
which I will call typicality frequentism, will evade the major criticisms raised against
previous forms of frequentism. In this theory, probabilities arise within a physical
theory from statistical behavior of almost all initial conditions. The main advantage
of typicality frequentism is that it shows which kinds of probabilities (that also have
empirical relevance) can be derived from physics. Although one cannot recover all
probability talk in this account, this is rather a virtue than a vice, because it shows
which types of probabilities can in fact arise from physics and which types need to
be explained in different ways, thereby opening the path for a pluralistic account of
probabilities.
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Frequentism is dead. This seems to be the consensus among contemporary philosophers. A recent
textbook on the philosophy of probabilities phrases it this way:
Although the frequency view remains popular outside philosophy – e.g. among statis-
ticians – it is not the subject of much, if any, active research. (Rowbottom, 2015, p.
112)
Frequentism may be useful for all practical purposes for statisticians, although it does not con-
vey the true meaning of probabilities, since philosophers have successfully exposed the underlying
unsurmountable problems. Therefore, active research for developing frequentism has been dis-
continued. Hájek (1996) prominently debunked finite frequentism; a decade later followed his
criticism of hypothetical frequentism (Hájek, 2009). Recently, La Caze (2016) agreed that any
version of frequentism is doomed to fail, at least in providing a comprehensive understanding of
probabilities.
I think we can breathe life back into frequentism and develop it into a serious account of prob-
abilities. I intend to defend frequentism against these criticisms and modify it in such a way that
it incorporates elements of finite frequentism, hypothetical frequentism, and the classical inter-
pretation of probabilities. I will call this account typicality frequentism, which defines, in brief,
probabilities as typical long-term frequencies based on the law of large numbers.
Typicality has been developed within Boltzmann’s reduction of thermodynamics to statistical
mechanics, but the scope of this notion is not particularly tied to statistical mechanics (Wagner,
2020). Wilhelm (2019) recently showed how typicality explanations work in general by connecting
them with Hempel’s deductive–nomological model. Ideas along these lines to derive probabilities
from typicality as special kinds of frequencies have been presented by Maudlin (2007a, 2018) and
sketched in the literature on Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics and the de Broglie–Bohm quantum
theory (for a brief overview, see Goldstein, 2012), but there has been no work contrasting this
kind of frequentism with the traditional theories of frequentism in order to establish typicality
frequentism as a serious alternative theory in its own right.
In my opinion, the biggest methodological error made by the forefathers of frequentism, like
Reichenbach (1949/1971), Venn (1888), and von Mises (1928/1957), was to interpret probabilities
as frequencies from empirical behavior: they started with how we talk about probabilities and tried
to underly an interpretation in terms of frequencies that supports their empiricism (Gillies, 2000,
Ch. 5). Instead, I propose a strategy from a physical theory to probabilities: starting with a de-
terministic fundamental physical theory and analyze how this theory introduces probabilities from
statistical behavior. Then we may recover how our general use of probabilities is backed up by
physics. But, as it turns out, some ordinary ways of talking about probability will not be recov-
ered within this approach. To account for these, we are free to introduce another, complementary
interpretation of probability—becoming pluralists about probability. The method I will be using to
define probabilities is the same statistical method that has been used to justify the thermodynamic
arrow of time in statistical mechanics or the arrow of time in electrodynamics (North, 2003).
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2 Typicality Frequentism
The idea behind typicality frequentism is to apply the tools from statistical mechanics to explain
how probabilities arise from deterministic physical dynamics. Maudlin (2018) is confident about
this strategy, “The challenge of deriving probabilities—or quasi-probabilities, probabilities with
tolerances—from an underlying deterministic dynamics can be met. Typicality is the conceptual
tool by which the trick is done.” An important predecessor of typicality frequentism, apart from
the different versions of frequentism, is the theory of probability by Johannes von Kries, laid out
in his Principien der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung (1886, engl. Principles of Probability Theory).
As von Kries’s view seems to be best characterized as objective Bayesianism (see p. 16 of the
introduction by Eberhardt and Glymour in Reichenbach, 2008) or as a predecessor of the logical
interpretation (Fioretti, 2001), subjective and objective aspects are intertwined. For my purpose, I
want to lay out in more detail the objective parts of von Kries’s account, because they contain some
essential features of typicality frequentism, although von Kries criticized the frequentist theories at
his time (Zabell, 2016b, section 3).
Influenced by the physics of the 19th century, it was important to von Kries to distinguish between
laws of nature and initial conditions (Pulte, 2016). Unlike Laplace, who reduced probability to
incomplete knowledge of the initial conditions, von Kries built up probabilities from objective
variations of initial conditions, and he called the sets of admissible initial conditions “Spielräume,”
which are best translated as “sets of possibilities”.1 More quantitatively, von Kries defined the
probability for an event E in the following way (see Pulte, 2016, section 5, for this reconstruction).
Let us say that the event E is brought about by the set of initial conditions C (given certain laws
of nature) and the set of initial conditions that do not bring about E is C∗ (C would be then
the “Spielraum” or set of possibilities for E). The probability p for E is then defined, in the
Laplacian sense, as the quotient of the favorable initial conditions leading to E over all possible





Although the objective aspect of probabilities mentioned here comes from the initial conditions of
the physical process, it is not a frequentist account. Moreover, this reconstruction of von Kries’s
theory may incline us to think that the Spielräume are unique and always tied to a physical theory,
but von Kries was in this respect more a pragmatist and sometimes even a skeptic (see the discus-
sion in Pulte, 2016, section 5). Depending on the knowledge of the agent building a probabilistic
model, the space of possibilities may change and may not be a space of initial conditions of a phys-
ical theory but rather a more generalized sample space; thus, the measure m may not be unique
either.
I share von Kries’s intuition to reduce probabilities to certain basic events, but I endeavor a more
objective account of probabilities always embedded into physics and using only the tools of physics
1Eberhard and Glymour call them “sets of ur-events” because they are the irreducible basis for von Kries’s probabilities
(see Reichenbach, 2008, Introduction, section 4.2).
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in defining probabilities. I, therefore, propose that physics offers a unique space from which to
derive probabilities as typical long-term frequencies. This is the fundamental space of physics,
like phase space or configuration space (depending on the physical theory). Here, I agree with
the method of arbitrary functions (or more adequately named the range account of probabilities
by Rosenthal, 2016), which can be regarded as a modern elaboration of von Kries’s theory. But I
deviate from the range account by incorporating typicality as a central notion to define probabilities;
in a similar fashion, it is possible to explain the thermodynamic arrow of time as arising from
generic initial conditions of the universe.
2.1 Typicality and the Arrow of Time
Scrambled eggs never unscramble, a shattered vase never reassembles itself, and ice cubes never
un-melt. Although our basic physical laws are time-reversal invariant, that is, the time-reversed
process of a physically possible process is also physically possible, such time-reversed processes
are not observed. Boltzmann proposed a solution to this problem by distinguishing microscopic
from macroscopic behavior and systems with few degrees of freedom from systems with many
degrees of freedom. It is the microscopic behavior that is time-reversal invariant, and one only
finds directed processes on the macroscopic level, when systems have many degrees of freedom.
If we have a sequence of photos showing a system of few degrees of freedom, like two rotating
molecules, we would not be able to distinguish forward from backward behavior, but if we have a
sequence of photos of a glass bottle thrown on the ground, we would distinguish one direction as
the true one.
Boltzmann gave an explanation in terms of statistics why such behavior is not observed. The
short answer is due to the many degrees of freedom of a macroscopic process: one had to finely
orchestrate all the many microscopic states of the particles constituting a macroscopic object in
order to yield a time-reversed process. If we don’t interfere this meticulously (and in most cases
we cannot do so), then a familiar directed process comes about. In other words, almost all initial
conditions of a macroscopic system yield the familiar directed processes; only very special initial
conditions yield the reversed process. So given broken glass on the floor, there are many more
states of particles constituting the pieces of glass such that these pieces remain on the floor than
those states that would converge the pieces into a brand-new bottle.
This behavior can be phrased by means of typicality: a physical behavior is called typical, if
almost all initial conditions yield this behavior (see, for instance, Goldstein, 2001; Lebowitz, 2008;
Myrvold, 2016; Volchan, 2007). And a physical behavior is called atypical, if almost none of the
initial conditions yield this behavior. So, it is typical that broken glass remains broken, and it is
atypical that scrambled eggs unscramble.
Boltzmann’s ideas on the irreversibility of physical processes have recently experienced a renais-
sance among philosophers in which the notion of typicality has become central (see, for instance,
Barrett, 2017; Frigg, 2009; Lazarovici and Reichert, 2015, 2019). The notion of typicality, as
we introduced it, is still too imprecise for quantitative use in physics. As Wilhelm (2019) rightly
emphasizes, there are many ways to formalize “almost all.” The right way to do so in statistical
mechanics is by means of a measure over phase space. Phase space is constructed from a set of
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particles in three-dimensional space.2 Consider N particles in three-dimensional space (if we have
a realistic macroscopic body,N is of the order of Avogadro’s constant, that is, approximately 1023).
Since a particle is completely described by its position x and momentum p, we can summarize the
complete physical state of N particles as a vector (x1,p1,x2,p2, . . . ,xN ,pN ), and this vector is
one point in phase space, which has roughly 6 × 1023 dimensions. So every point in phase space,
each microstate, represents a set of N particles with their precise positions and momenta. In order
to get macrostates, one needs to divide phase space P into disjoint subsets, where each set rep-
resents a macrostate (see Figure 1). So a macrostate arises from a map M that assigns to every
microstate X a macrostate M(X) corresponding to one of the subsets PM ⊆ P according to the
partition—M(X) is the macrostate of X if X ∈ PM .
Figure 1: Clusters in phase space according to thermodynamic macrostates and the measure of
typicality, as depicted by Roger Penrose (1989, p. 402). Thermal equilibrium is by far
the biggest macrostate in phase space.
The tool that ultimately explains irreversible behavior is Boltzmann’s definition of entropy as-
signed to every point in phase space:
SB(X) := kB ln|PM(X)|, (1)
where kB is Boltzmann’s constant and ln is the natural logarithm. The main part of Boltzmann’s
entropy is |PM(X)|, which deserves some elaboration. In order to measure the sizes of the subsets
PM(X), one needs to introduce a measure λ, which assigns a number to every such subset. Con-
ventionally, if the system is finite, one normalizes the measure to 1 such that the size of the entire
phase space would be 1. In the entropy formula, |PM(X)| denotes the size of PM(X) according to




. The only purpose of the measure λ is
to tell us which sets are big and which are small, in order to identify typical and atypical behavior;
2For simplicity’s sake and to be as close to Boltzmann’s reasoning as possible, I assume Newtonian mechanics as the
microscopic theory.
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in this sense, it is a measure of typicality. Since for real physical systems, like gases in a box or
melting ice cubes, the phase space volume of thermal equilibrium has by far the largest volume
according to the measure of typicality and so it has the highest entropy, we observe systems that
are not in equilibrium (low entropy SB) to reach equilibrium (high entropy SB), whereas we do
not see a system going from a high entropy state to a low entropy state, because the low entropy
states are much smaller in phase space.
Moreover, if we zoom into the phase space region of a low entropy macrostate, a melting ice
cube, for example, almost all microstates will move to a macrostate with higher entropy and ul-
timately to equilibrium. It is physically possible that a low entropy macrostate goes into another
low entropy macrostate (by itself), but there are very few microstates within this macro region
that do that. This is Boltzmann’s explanation why we observe only one direction of a physical
process and not the time-reversed process, although this behavior is physically possible according
to the time-reversal fundamental laws. The symmetry is broken by a statistical argument, that is,
by distinguishing those initial conditions that yield typical behavior from those that yield atypical
behavior.
In classical mechanics, one normally uses the Liouville measure, a natural generalization of the
standard Lebesgue measure on three-dimensional space to phase space, as the measure of typicality.
But in order to distinguish small sets from big sets, other measures would do the job as well. Indeed,
every measure that is absolutely continuous with respect to the Liouville measure will agree on the
same physical behavior to be typical or atypical.3 Moreover, there is a certain vagueness intended
in the notion of typicality that is to be reflected in the mathematical formalization. The sets A
yielding typical behavior are those that have measure 1 or close to one, that is, λ(A) = 1 − ε,
where ε is a very small number also depending on the application. Similarly, for atypical behavior
where the relevant sets may have a measure λ(B) = 0 + δ for some small δ, which depends on the
specific application.4 This will become important when we apply typicality and its mathematical
formalizations to develop a new theory of frequentism.
2.2 Probabilities as Typical Frequencies
There are two steps to present the theory of typicality frequentism. First, I need to elucidate the
role of random variables, in a way that differs from standard accounts of probability theory (section
2.2.1). In typicality frequentism, random variables are primarily used to bridge the gap between a
physical theory and the mathematics of probability theory. Second, this account of random vari-
ables is needed to interpret the law of large numbers in such a way to define probabilities as typical
long-term frequencies (section 2.2.2).
3A measure µ is absolutely continuous with respect to a measure λ (symbolically µ  λ), if all the null sets of λ are
null sets of µ, that is ∀X (λ(X) = 0⇒ µ(X) = 0).
4There has been a long debate to make Boltzmann’s argument more mathematically and conceptually precise. For our
purpose, we do not need to dive into these details (see, e.g., Volchan, 2007; Frigg, 2009; Werndl, 2013; Lazarovici
and Reichert, 2015; Myrvold, 2019).
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2.2.1 Random Variables and their Relation to Physics
Consider a box with 1000 balls; the balls are either blue, green, or red. Let’s say 500 balls are
blue, 300 are green, and 200 are red; in other words, 50% are blue, 30% are green, and 20%
are red. With this information we can build a simple stochastic model. The set of balls forms
the sample space Ω := {1, . . . , 1000}. From this sample space, we can define a coarse-graining
function X : Ω → {B,G,R}, which assigns to every ball a color B=blue, G=green, or R=red.
Functions of this kind are usually (and unfortunately misleadingly) called random variables. There
is indeed nothing random about them; their only use is to abstract from the sample space, when
one is interested in specific features of the members of the sample space. Next, one determines the
distribution of the random variable. This is a function ρX : F (X) = {B,G,R} → [0, 1], such
that ρX(B) = 0.5, ρX(G) = 0.3, and ρX(R) = 0.2. This illustrates the standard way of building
a probability space (see Fig. 2).5
The distribution ρ is normally called a probability distribution, for it assigns “probabilities” to
certain sets of the sample space. But this would be putting the cart before the horse; at this stage, we
do not have a theory of probabilities, just a certain recipe for building a mathematical model. This
particular model of colored balls is conceptually very simple, because the numbers 50%, 30%, and
20% are mere proportions of balls having the same color. Nevertheless, some work is to be done to
interpret these numbers correctly as probabilities, as we will be doing in the next subsection, when
I fully lay out typicality frequentism.
The sample space can be in principle any kind of (mathematical) space, and in general no partic-
ular attention is paid to the sample space in textbooks, because in order to make correct predictions
the images of the random variables and the probability distribution are sufficient. I want to go
beyond a pragmatic attitude toward probability theory, although it is justified by its success in ap-
plication, and derive probabilities instead from physical behavior. This is where von Kries’s idea
of sets of possibilities or ur-events comes in. He wanted to prove that probabilities can be derived
from certain compositions of ur-events—random variables, in his account, are defined on these
spaces. Although he intended an objective theory of probability, von Kries had to rely on a sub-
jective element in order to justify that ur-events are equiprobable. This element is the Principle of
Indifference, which he advocated in the form of a principle of insufficient reason: Two events are
equipossible if at the current state of knowledge there is no reason to consider one of the events
more likely than the other (Reichenbach, 2008, p. 15).
It is, however, possible to retain ur-events without this subjective ingredient. There is a distin-
guished sample space among all possible sample spaces, namely, phase space, on which a typi-
cality measure can be defined, thereby erasing the principle of insufficient reason.6 I now make
the following postulate: all random variables are ultimately defined on phase space, because all
statistical patterns are determined by what happens in the fundamental physical space, which are
governed by the laws of physics. Hence, probability theory ultimately works because it is embed-
5There are some subtleties when one generalizes this scheme to infinite sample spaces, like, forming a σ-algebra.
These are treated in standard textbooks on probability theory and are not the focus of this paper.








Figure 2: The ingredients of a stochastic model and how they relate to each other. Random vari-
ablesX abstract from the sample space Ω by assigning every member of Ω a real number.
Abstracting means that X maps many elements in its domain to the same number. The
image of X gets assigned a number in the interval [0, 1], which measures the size of the
sets that are mapped by X to the same real number. It’s important for typicality fre-
quentism that all random variables are ultimately defined on phase space, which is the
fundamental sample space.
ded into physics, and it is so successful because it abstracts from many physical details, so that
when we apply probability theory we, in most cases, are not aware of the relations to fundamental
physics.
In the above example, the sample space Ω, which distinguishes the different balls, is a coarse-
grained space of phase space PB , which describes the balls’ actual positions and velocities. These
two spaces are also connected by a random variable XB : PB → Ω. We can even go one floor
deeper to the fundamental phase space. Every ball is a macroscopic object consisting of zillions
of tiny particles. The positions and momenta of these particles are summarized in the fundamental
phase space Pf . Again a random variable Xf connects this fundamental space to PB , that is,
Xf : Pf → PB .
Of course, this interpretation of probability theory will not be shared by subjective Bayesians and
other schools. My goal is not to provide a framework that suits all interpretations of probability
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but rather to interpret probability theory in such a way that is best suited for a modern version of
frequentism.
2.2.2 Probability from Typicality
Let us now apply all this to demonstrate how probability arises from typicality. Recall Boltzmann’s
explanation that we observe certain physical processes only in one direction: it is typical that ice
cubes melt and not unmelt because the universe started in a low entropy macrostate, where most of
the initial microstates yield a universe in which ice cubes melt. A very similar kind of explanation
can be given for the emergence of probabilities from a deterministic dynamics. For simplicity’s
sake, I’ll restrict myself to coin tosses, which is a deterministic physical process following the laws
of Newtonian mechanics, but it is, in principle, straightforward to generalize the main idea to other
physical processes and to other deterministic physical theories.
First, there is an observational fact about coin tosses, as there is an observational fact about the
thermodynamic behavior of ice cubes: When we toss a coin thousands of times, we see that heads
and tails appear approximately half the time, and the more we toss the closer the fraction of heads
and tails approaches 1/2. For instance, Kerrich (1946) noted to have tossed a coin 10,000 times of
which heads appeared 5,067 times, and it’s also said that Karl Pearson tossed a coin 24,000 times
of which heads appeared 12,012 times (see Küchenhoff, 2008, although no source for Pearson’s
experiment is given).
Second, recall from the thermodynamic arrow of time that almost all points in phase space are
in thermal equilibrium, where every point represents the physical state of a gas in a box or the
entire universe. When the system starts from a low-entropy macrostate, statistical mechanics says
that almost all phase space points within this macrostate will follow a trajectory according to the
Newtonian laws of motion that leads to thermal equilibrium (for not too long time scales). If, say,
Γ is this low-entropy macrostate and P is the property “following a trajectory that leads to thermal
equilibrium,” then the property P is said to be typical in Γ (see Wilhelm, 2019, p. 4, for this gen-
eral framework). (We can imagine the property P to give a certain color to phase-space points.)
Next, let’s say we are interested in the behavior of a subsystem with respect to the initial conditions
of a larger system, for example, gases in a box with respect to the initial conditions of the entire
universe. Then given the special low-entropy initial macrostate of the universe, it is typical (within
this macrostate) that subsystems in this universe will reflect thermodynamically time-oriented be-
havior. In other words, Γ would be the low-entropy initial macrostate of the entire universe, and
the property P would be “subsystems reflect thermodynamically time-oriented behavior”. (Then
again, almost all points in this macrostate would have the same color).
This relation between the behavior of subsystems and the initial conditions of the universe is
central to typicality frequentism. When we apply this picture to the coin toss, we need to start
with the phase space regions of the entire universe in which coins exist. The relevant property
P is “long-term frequencies of fair coin-tosses are approximately 1⁄2”. It turns out that almost all
universes share this property.
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where ε is an arbitrary small real number, N is taken to be very large, the random variables Xk
represents the kth toss, Xk(x) is the result of the kth toss determined by the initial condition of the
universe x, and λ is the measure of typicality. For typical coin tosses, that is, for most universes in
which coins are tossed, which translates mathematically into λ(·) ≈ 1, the arithmetical mean of an
actual run of tosses does not deviate from 1/2 more than ε. So in any sufficiently long finite series
of flips in these generic universes the frequency of heads and tails will be in the range of 50%± ε
for some specific ε.
There is something different and something similar between finite and infinite sequences. In
both cases the fraction of heads and tails lies within ±ε from 50%, but ε in the finite case cannot
be arbitrarily small and the actual frequency to be (typically) within the error bounds, whereas
that is the case for infinite (or sufficiently long) sequences according to the law of large numbers.
However small ε is chosen, it is typical that an infinite series of coin flips will have a limiting
frequency within 50%± ε. Note also that the finite case has to be sufficiently large in order to show
some robust behavior.8
Moreover, the law of large numbers mathematically says that a series of coin flips that shows












For any large ε you choose, there is a very small set of initial conditions that would give a long
series that deviate from 50%± ε.
One may argue that the law of large numbers is a limit theorem and so doesn’t say anything
about finite cases, nor does it say anything about what is typical or atypical (I thank an anonymous
referee for raising these concerns). One needs to distinguish between what the limit of a sequence
is and how the sequence approaches the limit. Finding out about the right convergence behavior is,
for example, a major task in functional analysis and mathematical quantum mechanics (Lieb and
7Whenever I refer to the law of large numbers, I always mean the weak law of large numbers.
8 More precisely, there are three parameters in the law of large numbers that are fixed successively. First, one chooses

























Seiringer, 2010). Here is a simple example to illustrate this point. The three sequences 1n ,
1
ln(n) ,
and 1ln(ln(n)) go to 0 for n → ∞. These sequences, however, approach the limit differently:
1
ln(n)
goes to 0 more slowly than 1n , and
1
ln(ln(n)) even more slowly than
1
ln(n) .
9 If one traces a certain
(standard) proof of the weak law of large numbers, one finds the formula footnote 8, which can
be itself proven and which tells us something about the limit behavior of finite sequences. Then,
given how typicality is defined via a measure, one can indeed rephrase the law of large numbers,
as well as the limit behavior of finite sequences, in terms of typicality. I admit that this is not how
the law of large numbers is standardly understood, but it is a possible, and I think consistent, way
of re-interpreting what the law of large numbers says (see also Dürr et al., 2017).
After these elaborations, we can finally define what probabilities are in typicality frequentism:
Definition of probability: Some state of affairs has probability p, if, according to a fundamen-
tal physical theory, the physical process Xk yielding this state of affairs is in principle infinitely
repeatable and the instances of Xk are uncorrelated such that the frequency typically (that is, in




(∣∣∣ 1N ∑Nk=1Xk(x)− p∣∣∣ < ε) = 1.
This definition has several important parts that I want to comment on:10
1. Definition of probability: One may argue that what follows is not a definition but rather a
sufficient condition for probabilities, because what the definition says requires certain strong
idealizations that may not be met. My reply is twofold. For one, this is a definition of what
probabilities are in typicality frequentism. For another, if one takes a broader view of what
probabilities are in general, then this “definition” is indeed a sufficient (but not necessary)
condition of probabilities, since I am aware that other ways of talking about probabilities
differs from a frequentist account. I, therefore, advocate a pluralist theory of probabilities
that complements typicality frequentism in areas where typicality frequentism does not give
an account of probabilities.
2. State of affairs: I use “state of affairs” instead of “events” that get assigned probabilities, in
order not to confuse events with the standard technical term in probability theory as a subset
of the sample space or, more precisely, a member of the σ-algebra. The tossing of a coin or
a ball in roulette would be examples of “states of affairs”.
3. The fundamental physical theory: In the ideal case, the fundamental physical theory I refer
to is the Theory of Everything, the unique physical theory that correctly represents the world.
Since we haven’t found this theory yet, other approximately true deterministic physical the-
ories can do the job, like Newtonian physics or the de Broglie–Bohm quantum theory. The
theory needs to be approximately true in order to give rise to (at least) the right statistical pat-





≈ 0.072, and 1
ln(ln(1,000,000))
≈ 0.38.
10I thank an anonymous referee for raising many of the following points.
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and it is good enough for most macroscopic applications. It is also very unlikely that New-
tonian physics and statistical mechanics will be completely overthrown by future physical
theories. It is plausible to assume that both theories will be recovered in a kind of classical
limit. A candidate for a deterministic theory on the quantum level is the de Broglie–Bohm
pilot-wave theory, which also allows for extension to quantum field theory. Another deter-
ministic quantum theory is the many-worlds theory according to Everett. My introduction
of probabilities is closer to the de Broglie–Bohm theory, but also Hugh Everett III wanted to
base probabilities on typicality (Barrett, 2017). I also think that one can generalize typical-
ity frequentism to indeterministic theories, which would be a future project and would also
require to distinguish this idea from propensities.
4. Uncorrelated events: The events Xk (or rather the random variables) that build up the phys-
ical process need to be uncorrelated in order to converge. Standardly, the law of large num-
bers requires the events of the stochastic process to be stochastically independent, which is
a stronger condition than being uncorrelated. If the Xk’s were correlated (for example, the
individual tosses of a coin), then one would be able to undermine the law of large numbers,
and a unique limit may not exist. Or a limit may exist but it would not be p, where p is
technically the expectation value of Xk.
5. The frequency: The frequency that is supposed to approach the limit p is the relative (fi-
nite) frequency of the the physical process Xk: 1N
∑N
k=1Xk(x). For a coin toss, for ex-












would then be the relative frequency for heads.
6. Almost all universes: One may think that one needs to quantify over all universes in order to
determine the probabilities in our universe, and, therefore, the probabilities in our universe
are also determined by what happens in other universes. The first part is correct—that one
needs to quantify over all possible universes—but this doesn’t mean that the probabilities
here are determined by the goings-on in the other universes. Rather, one needs to compare
what happens here to what happens there, and the appropriate tool for this comparison is the
measure of typicality. If we are in such a world in which the assumptions of the law of large
numbers hold, then the probabilities are particularly robust and regular, because most of the
other universes show the same statistical pattern.11 The “atypical” worlds widely diverge
from the typical ones and also widely diverge among themselves. There is no unifying or
regular behavior to be expected in these “atypical” universes.
We need to distinguish between the definition of probability and the empirical significance of
this number. While the number p, is defined in terms of infinite sequences, which cannot be in-
stantiated in the real world, the empirical content of this number arises from its relation to finite
11There is one caveat: even if all the assumptions of the law of large numbers were fulfilled it is still possible for a




Empirical significance of p: The relative frequencies of finite sequences obey the restrictions given
by the law of large numbers; that is, the observed frequencies of sufficiently long finite series
typically lie in an interval p± ε, where ε is a positive number approximately equal to 0.
Let me add the following comments:12
1. Status of the empirical significance of p: I take it to be a true statement about the observed
relative frequencies, and that this statement follows from the definition of probabilities. It is,
therefore, rather a corollary than a criterion, since a criterion would be something closer to
an axiom.
2. Sufficiently long series: The above definition of probabilities presupposes that the physical
process is “in principle infinitely repeatable”, but, of course, it doesn’t and cannot say how
often the real process is actually repeated. The probability p is empirically significant be-
cause it gives bounds for the real observed (and expected) relative frequencies. It may be
unsatisfactory that the real process needs to be “sufficiently long” without a precise numeri-
cal length. The appropriate length of the series depends on many factors of the real physical
set-up and the overall physical process.
3. Interval p ± ε: For real world cases, one has tolerances for the relative frequencies. The
question is now how robust these tolerances are. A small “uncertainty” of p would also be
consistent with the observed frequency being within the interval. First, I assume the real p,
the one given by the true Theory of Everything, to be unique. Second, I assume that the
approximately true candidate theories that are not the Theory of Everything, like Newtonian
physics or the de Broglie–Bohm theory, etc., would give p’s that are very similar. So in
this case, there may be a tiny interval or at least a point-like spread of p’s. And we would
have to say that there are several ”candidate probabilities”. Perhaps one of them hits the true
probability; I assume, however, that these “candidate probabilities” are very close to the true
one and for all practical purposes indistinguishable.
In typicality frequentism, there are actually three ideas mingled together from other interpre-
tations of probability. The first ingredient is similar to the classical interpretation of probability,
which adds up different equally probable events according to the principle of indifference. Every-
thing in typicality frequentism hinges on a proper way of counting that leads us to distinguish typ-
ical from atypical behavior based on big and small sets, whose elements are intrinsically “equally
likely” to occur. Second, the definition of probabilities in terms of a limit that cannot be carried
out in the real world is reminiscent of hypothetical frequentism. Third, in order to make these
typical frequencies empirically meaningful one needs to introduce tolerances for finite sequences
in order to have realistic frequency bands for actual processes, but in contrast to finite frequentism
probabilities in typicality frequentism are not defined by finite sequences.
12I also thank here an anonymous referee for raising these issues.
12
There are two ways to undermine the long-term frequency of 1⁄2. Either one is in one of those
special universes that yield a different statistical pattern for fair coin tosses, or one were able to
replicate, say, with a sophisticated tossing machine, the exact conditions in every toss. The special
universes that yield atypical coin behavior may reflect all kinds of long-term coin pattern: there
are initial conditions of the universe that lead to 95% heads and also to no regular behavior at
all. Because of these diverse behaviors, there is no way to put these special universes under one
umbrella. It is, however, appropriate to talk of a probability of 100% showing heads in the toss-
ing machine example. In order to get probabilities diverging from 100% or 0%, physics requires
significant variations in the ways a coin is tossed (as is realistic), and these variations in fact yield
robust statistical patterns.
As Gillies (2000, Ch. 5) describes, the problem of connecting limiting frequencies with actual
finite frequencies had been raised by de Finetti against von Mises (1928/1957):
It is often thought that these objections may be escaped by observing that the im-
possibility of making the relations between probabilities and frequencies precise is
analogous to the practical impossibility that is encountered in all the experimental sci-
ences of relating exactly the abstract notions of the theory and the empirical realities.
The analogy is, in my view, illusory: in the other sciences one has a theory which as-
serts and predicts with certainty and exactitude what would happen if the theory were
completely exact; in the calculus of probability it is the theory itself which obliges us
to admit the possibility of all frequencies. In the other sciences the uncertainty flows
indeed from the imperfect connection between the theory and the facts; in our case, on
the contrary, it does not have its origin in this link, but in the body of the theory itself
[. . . ]. (de Finetti, 1937, p. 77)
The criticism against frequentism is (i) that limiting frequencies as predicted in infinite series are
not observed, (ii) that there is no precise way to give an interval for the empirical frequencies, and
(iii) that if an interval is given it is still possible that the actual observed frequency may lie outside
this interval. Von Mises argued (see Gillies, 2000, p. 103), as described in the first sentence of de
Finetti’s quote, that the problem of connecting limiting frequencies with actual frequencies is no
different from connecting the idealized predictions of a scientific theory with actual observations,
something ubiquitous and practically unproblematic in all of the natural sciences. To which, de
Finetti replied that this analogy is invalid because a scientific theory would in principle be able to
make exact predictions if it were to capture sufficiently all the relevant details of the world, whereas
probability theory, even in the best case, would allow significant deviations from its predictions,
both from the limiting frequencies, as well as from finite frequencies.
I think, de Finetti’s criticism of von Mises is correct, and von Mises indeed overlooked the
disanalogy between probability theory and the standard application of scientific theories. The im-
precision of probability theory has a different origin than the imprecision of applying scientific
theories or scientific models to real world cases. The main problem for von Mises was to justify
were the imprecision of his frequentism comes from. Since his theory was solely based on empir-
ical facts, the truthmakers for the predictions of probability theory need to be empirical facts too.
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But how can these exceptions be empirically made true if they are rarely or never observed in the
first place?
Hájek (2009, pp. 217–8) makes the same argument as de Finetti when he says, “There is no Fact
of what the Hypothetical Sequences Look Like”. He imagines a coin that is just tossed once and
happens to have landed Heads. Hájek then asks about the coin:
How would it have landed if tossed infinitely many times? Never mind that—let’s
answer a seemingly easier question: how would it have landed on the second toss?
Suppose you say "Heads". Why Heads! The coin equally could have landed Tails, so
I say that it would have. We can each pound the table if we like, but we can’t both be
right. More than that: neither of us can be right. For to give a definite answer as to
how a chancy device would behave is to misunderstand chance. (Hájek, 2009, p. 217)
Again, this argument is valid for the traditional version of frequentism, but in typicality frequen-
tism a physical theory tells us “how the coin would have landed on the second toss”. The truthmak-
ers for the predicted frequencies come from a physical theory, in particular, from the distributions
of initial conditions of the micro-constituents of the involved physical bodies and ultimately of the
entire universe itself—of course, this move would be contested by an empiricist like von Mises.
Typicality frequentism, thus, explains why probability theory is intrinsically imprecise and that this
imprecision cannot be improved, but at least to certain degree quantified and grounded.
3 Defending Typicality Frequentism
Typicality Frequentism combines ideas from finite frequentism, hypothetical frequentism, and the
classical interpretation of probabilities. Finite frequencies (with error bounds) describe actual out-
comes of a series of a chancy process; hypothetical frequencies in terms of infinite series are used
to define what probabilities are; and the principle of indifference, which is the central piece of the
classical interpretation, is replaced by a measure of typicality to count events on the sample space.
It seems, therefore, that the critique raised against either of these interpretations of probability is
again effective to undermine typicality frequentism. The principle of indifference has been rightly
dismissed when an agent is truly ignorant—although it may be successfully used for symmetry
arguments (Zabell, 2016a). Hájek (1996, 2009) presents a total of 30 arguments against differ-
ent versions of frequentism, 15 against finite and 15 against hypothetical frequentism, demanding
that in order to rescue any kind of frequentist account all these arguments need to be countered,
where one counterargument would still leave the other 29 unanswered. I won’t endeavor to reply
to every single argument, because not all counterarguments are in fact counterarguments but rather
characterize a frequentist’s account. Instead, I will first contrast typicality frequentism with two
most recent competitors, the range account and the Humean Mentaculus. Then I will counter some
recent arguments raised against frequentism by La Caze (2016), who builds on Hájek’s papers.
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3.1 The Range-Account of Probabilities
The work by von Kries (1886) was a rich source for further research. Henri Poincaré and Ed-
uard Hopf filled in a major gap by developing the method of arbitrary functions, which is also
known as the range-account of probabilities, advocated and further refined in different versions by
Abrams (2012), Rosenthal (2010, 2016), and Strevens (2003, 2008, 2013). Here, the probabilities,
like in typicality frequentism, are related to some sort of initial conditions, but, unlike typicality
frequentism, regions of phase space together with a probability density or a volume measure di-
rectly determine probabilities. For example, for the coin toss a probability density over the initial
conditions for every single toss is used (see Figure 3). The physical state of a coin is completely
described by its vertical velocity v for the trajectory of the coin and the angular momentum ω for
its rotation, given a fixed height and further simplifying restrictions, like the exclusion of bouncing
(see Keller, 1986; Strzałko et al., 2008; Stefan and Cheche, 2017, for detailed physical models).
The phase space structure for the coin toss has a regular structure, in which the size of the areas
leading the coin to land on the same side as it has started are approximately equal to the size of the
areas for which the coin changes faces (if v or ω are not too small). In the method of arbitrary func-
tions, probabilities result when a probability density is integrated over specific regions in this phase
space. The main two problems for the method of arbitrary functions is, first, to justify the particular
shape of the probability density and, second, to base this justification on non-probabilistic facts in
order not to explain probabilities by probabilities. This is the main point in which Abrams, Rosen-
thal, and Strevens disagree. They agree, however, that some measure must be used to determine
the sizes of phase space regions in terms of which probabilities are defined.
The range account of probability is easily confused with typicality frequentism. First, the range
account does not define probabilities in terms of frequencies. Nonetheless, Strevens’s account, for
example, relies on a close link to frequencies; he aims at explaining probabilities in long series
of trials and facts about frequencies determine facts about the (initial) probability density (see
also Strevens, 2011, section 4.2 and 4.3). Second, typicality frequentism considers, like statistical
mechanics, the initial conditions for the entire universe, where a measure of typicality is imposed
on. All these initial conditions are grouped into two main groups: almost all initial conditions
lead to typical behavior, whereas almost no initial conditions lead to atypical behavior (there may
be remaining sets that do not fit in either category, but they are not important for our current
purposes). The typicality measure is only used to group the initial conditions of the universe, from
which probabilities are defined in terms of frequencies.
There are several problems a range account faces, which Abrams, Rosenthal, and Strevens are
aware of and have reacted to. First, one needs to justify the initial probability distribution. Where
did it come from? Second, by explaining the probabilities for a coin toss by a probability distribu-
tion over the initial conditions, one would explain probabilities with probabilities. It is a challenge
to explain the properties of the initial probability density from non-probabilistic facts in order not
to make the theory circular. Third, a probability distribution actually contains much more informa-
tion than is needed to get probabilities for frequencies. Typicality frequentism, on the other hand,
introduces something weaker than an initial probability distribution that is more tailored to define
probabilities as special kinds of frequencies, and it does not suffer from a circular argument (see
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Fig. 1. Keller’s [38] coin tossing model (rotation around axis (⇠ ) parallel to x).
Fig. 2. Decomposition of the phase space (!0/⇡ , v0/g) into regions where the coin comes up as it started (white regions) or opposite (dark regions) [38].
Our studies give arguments supporting the statement that the outcome of the coin tossing procedure is fully determined
by the initial conditions, i.e., no dynamical uncertainties due to the exponential divergence of initial conditions or fractal
basin boundaries have been identified. We analyze the dynamics of general 3D model of a coin. The cases of uniform and
nonuniform coins as well as the influence of air resistance and the impacts between the coin and surface are considered.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the results of experimental observations of the tossed coin motion.
In Section 3 the coin, a round disk with nonuniform mass distribution is described as a rigid body. It is assumed that the
coin is released above a plain floor. Euler angles and Euler parameters (normalized quaternions) are used to describe the
orientation of the coin. A realistic mechanical model of the coin tossing is constructed in Section 4. It examines whether
the initial states leading to heads or tails are distributed uniformly in phase space. The outcome of one trial from the given
initial condition is determined via a following series of processes and conditions; (i) free fall process, i.e., the coin falls and
rotates during the motion over the floor, (ii) contact condition which determines the moment at which the coin touches
the floor, (iii) collision process (we assume that the force the coin receives from the floor is impulsive), (iv) stop condition
which determines the moment after which the outcome of tossing is determined. We derive the equations of motion for
the cases; (i) the imperfect coin, (ii) the ideal coin, (iii) the thin coin, (iv) 1D model of the coin. Section 5 shows numerical
results of the simulation of the dynamics in several cases; (i) after the free fall the coin collides with a soft surface, (ii) the
coin collideswith a flat smooth surface (no friction between the coin and the floor surface), (iii) the coin collideswith a rough
surface (friction between the coin and the surface), (iv) with air resistance during free fall. Our results are comparedwith the
results of Kechen [37], Mizuguchi and Suwashita [49] and Vulovi¢ and Prange [67] (Section 5.1). Section 5.2 presents basins
of attraction of heads and tails (sets of initial conditions leading to both outcomes) which are calculated. It is shown that the
boundaries between heads and tails domains are smooth. This allows us to state our main result that there exists an open set
of initial conditions for which the outcome of the coin tossing is predictable. In Section 5.3 we point out that although heads and
tails boundaries are smooth, the distance of a typical initial condition from a basin boundary is so small that practically any
uncertainty (not infinitely small) in initial conditions can lead to the uncertainty of the result of tossing. Finally in Section 6
we summarize our results pointing out that the outcome of the coin tossing process is determined by the initial state.
Figure 3: This shows the partition of phase space for the initial conditions of a single coin, which
determine how the coin will land after it is tossed. The x-axis represents the initial condi-
tio s for the angular mom ntum around a certain axis; the y-axi represents the vertical
velocity of the entire oin. P nk ar as depict the initial conditio s f r which the coin
lands on the same f ce as it started, while the white areas stand for the i itial conditi ns
for which the coin changes faces. In the method of arbitrary functions, one puts a prob-
ability density on this phase space, which gives 1/2 once integrated over all the pink or
all the white areas. (Picture from Strzałko et al. (2008, p. 62) as an elaboration of Keller
(1986, p. 193).)
the next section for a more detailed discussion of this point).
Fourth, typicality frequentism can explain the initial probability distribution of the range-account
(if it is the one used for frequencies). It is known that the probabilities in repeatable processes are
robust under many changes of the initial probability distribution. Only very special distributions
(Rosenthal, 2016, calls them ‘eccentric’) would lead to different probability assignments. In typi-
cality frequentism these distributions are, in fact, explained to arise from special initial conditions
of the universe yielding atypical behavior. Strevens (2011, p. 355–6) seems to be aware of this
when he says, “t e typical actual pre-toss state, together with the typical actual set of mings and
th typical actual coin, usually produce—because f such and such properties of the physiology of
tossing—a macroperiodic set of spin speeds.” But instead of embedding his theory into a theory
of typicality, Strevens borrows from Lewis’s possible-worlds semantics to explain why we observe
typical frequencies in our world.
3.2 The Humean Mentaculus
Albert (2000, 2015) and Loewer (2001, 2004, 2012) have been working on a Humean account
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of probabilities.13 Similar to the range account, they postulate an initial probability distribution,
but this initial probability distribution is defined on the phase space for the initial conditions of
the entire universe. More precisely, the Albert–Loewer account of probabilities consists of three
postulates:
1. The fundamental deterministic laws of physics.
2. The existence of a special (low-entropy) macrostate (called the past hypothesis).
3. A probability distribution over the initial conditions of the universe (within this macrostate).
These three postulates are embedded in a Humean interpretation of laws of nature, so they are ax-
ioms in the best systematization of the Humean mosaic, balancing simplicity, strength, and fit. The
initial probability distribution assigns a probability to all kinds of factual and counterfactual events.
These three postulates, the Mentaculus, are said to form a probability map of the history of the uni-
verse. Probabilities in this theory are defined, similarly to the range account, as weighed regions of
initial conditions of the universe (in phase space); in other words, one counts and weighs, accord-
ing to the initial probability distribution, all possible initial conditions of the universe that would
give rise to the relevant phenomenon. And again, as the range-account, the Mentaculus needs to
explain what it means for the initial probability distribution to be a probability distribution. So far,
the probability distribution axiomatically introduced by the Mentaculus is merely a mathematical
object that assigns numbers to certain sets.
The central feature and goal of the Albert–Loewer account is “to obtain a definite numerical
assignment of probability to every formulable proposition about the physical history of the world”
(Albert, 2015, p. 7-8). This probability map assigns a probability not only to coin tosses but also
to events that may happen (or not) just once, like France defending the Soccer World Cup title in
2022. There seems to be a shared intuition that these single-case probabilities are meaningful and
crucial to the notion of probability—a point that has been raised against frequentism:
The most famous problem for finite frequentism is the problem of single case. Ac-
cording to finite frequentism all single-case events automatically have the probability
0 or 1. Consider a coin that is only tossed once and comes up Heads. It appears that
the probability of heads may be intermediate, but the finite frequentist is unable to
say this. This goes against some strong intuitions about probability. A form of this
problem remains in larger finite sequences. (La Caze, 2016, p. 343)
This criticism was raised early on against frequentism, to which von Mises answered:
‘The probability of winning a battle’, for instance, has no place in our theory of prob-
ability, because we cannot think of a collective to which it belongs. The theory of
probability cannot be applied to this problem any more than the physical concept of
work can be applied to the calculation of the ‘work’ done by an actor in reciting his
part in a play. (von Mises, quoted in Gillies, 2000, p. 98)
13Hoefer (2007, 2011, 2019) developed a more pragmatic account of Humean probabilities, which is closely linked to
the Albert–Loewer account.
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For many it was a shortcoming of frequentism that it does not assign probabilities to single events,
although it ought to do so (Hájek, 2009, p. 227–8). Von Mises argues, and I agree with him here,
that scientific concepts may not capture the full range of intuitive notions and it may not even be
the goal of science to form concepts that capture all the different meanings of an intuitive notion.
Scientific concepts are defined in a precise way for the price of being less general. Probability,
according to von Mises, is like the word “work” in physics, which has a precise meaning in terms
of an integral of the forces along a certain path and which, thus, differs from the everyday meaning
of “work”. Von Mises was, therefore, open to a pluralistic account of probability dependent on the
field of application.
In contrast to von Mises, other frequentists tried to generalize probabilities to single cases as a
kind of fictitious value:
Frequentists from Venn to Reichenbach have attempted to show how the frequency
concept can be made to apply to the single case. According to Reichenbach, the prob-
ability concept is extended by giving probability a “fictitious” meaning in reference to
single events. We find the probability associated with an infinite sequence and transfer
that value to a given single member of it. (Salmon, 1966, p. 90)
Although one can formally or “fictitiously” assign these numbers from frequencies to single events,
their meaning is unclear, especially their meaning as something objective or physical. This is not
only a problem for frequentism, but also for the Humean Mentaculus because it is unclear what
a probability in an objective or physical sense for a single event is in the first place. A purely
subjective account, on the other hand, would not have this problem, as probabilities are an agent’s
degree of belief, which are meaningful for single events, because they capture how confident an
agent is to believe a proposition.
In the Mentaculus, probabilities are introduced by a probability density over the initial conditions
of the universe, but this probability density, it shall be noted, merely axiomatically introduces
numbers on the Humean mosaic. To make this distribution of numbers a probability distribution
requires further elaboration and an interpretation that turns these numbers into probabilities. This
is accomplished in two steps (Loewer, 2004). First, the concept of “fit” is introduced. Every
(probabilistic) proposition is said to have a certain degree of fit, that is, how likely it is to be true,
and this is quantified by a probability. If a proposition with high probability matches the actual
facts, it has a better fit than a proposition with low probability.14 Second, in order that fit in terms
of probabilities is informative, an agent needs to constrain her belief according to these probabilities
(Loewer, 2004, p. 1122), and this is done according to another axiom, the Principal Principle. It
roughly says that an agent ought to adjust her degree of belief or her credence according to the
probability of the proposition given by the Humean best system.
It is not immediately clear what the physical meaning of single-case probabilities is in this
Humean theory. Let us say that there are two coins, and the Mentaculus assigns a probability
of landing heads of 0.4 to one coin and 0.6 to the other. Each coin is just once tossed and then
14The concept of fit leads to the zero-fit problem; Elga (2004) proposes a solution by invoking a certain notion of
typicality.
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destroyed. What can these numbers 0.4 and 0.6 mean? These probabilities indeed influence, by
the Principal Principle, an agent’s attitude and behavior toward the outcome of the coin tosses. For
example, an agent will bet differently on an event with probability of 0.4 than on an event with a
probability of 0.6. It seems, however, that these single-case probabilities need also to say some-
thing about the physical events themselves, whether their occurrence is in some way constrained
or not, which is then the basis for an agent to adjust her degree of belief. Moreover, this example
of two coins being tossed just once is in principle repeatable, and so Humeans need to clarify the
relationship between these single-case probabilities and the frequencies of repeatable coin tosses.
Although the Albert–Loewer account of Humean probabilities explicitly introduces and endorses
single-case probabilities, it is, as of now, unclear what their objective physical meaning is supposed
to be.
3.3 Countering Standard Critique of Frequentism
Building on Hájek’s critique of frequentism, La Caze (2016) launched another comprehensive at-
tack. Here, I reply to four of La Caze’s arguments: (i) that frequentism is a poor analysis of
probabilities, (ii) the problem of ascertainability, (iii) the reference class problem, and (iv) that
frequentism is not completely objective.
3.3.1 It’s a Poor Analysis of Probabilities
La Caze (2016) claims that hypothetical frequencies are not the right description of probabilities
because they provide a poor analysis of what probabilities are:
The hypothetical frequentist provides an answer to the question “What is probability?”
with an analysis that has little relationship with what most people mean by the proba-
bility statements they make. [. . . ] When stating that a specific coin has the probability
of Heads of half, people are typically referring to their beliefs about the coin, their
experience with this coin in a finite series of tosses, or their experience with similar-
seeming coins. (La Caze, 2016, p. 350)
The aim of typicality frequentism is not to reduce all ways in which probabilities are invoked to
typical long-term frequencies. It, rather, aims at showing how one can derive from fundamental
physics physically meaningful probabilities, and it is open to be complemented by other accounts
of probability outside its scope. Given the myriads of different cases in which probabilities are
used, it is plausible that all these cases are not unified by one account. Typicality frequentism
would be, in my view, one piece in a pluralistic landscape of probabilities. Moreover, if typicality
frequentism is true, then people may need to re-think their intuitions they have about probabilities
of coins and other physical processes. I aim at giving an account of objective probability, but I
agree that we also need an account of subjective probabilities, and I can envision that it may be
possible, in certain circumstances, to connect a particular interpretation of subjective probabilities
with typicality frequentism.
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3.3.2 The Problem of Ascertainability
“[T]he problem of ascertainability is the most fundamental difficulty the frequency interpretation
faces,” says (Salmon, 1966, p. 89–90), and he defines this problem in the following way:
Ascertainability. This criterion requires that there be some method by which, in prin-
ciple at least, we can ascertain values of probabilities. It merely expresses the fact that
a concept of probability will be useless if it is impossible in principle to find out what
the probabilities are. (Salmon, 1966, p. 64, my emphasis)
Actually, all interpretations of probability face in one form or other the problem of ascertainability,
that is, how to assign probabilities in practice. A meaningful definition is not enough, because
it may lack the instructions for how to pick the right probabilities. Salmon stresses that these
instructions, however, are supposed to be applicable only in principle, and not necessarily in actual
practice. Applied to hypothetical frequencies, they are said to be unascertainable for the following
reasons (see also Hájek, 2009, pp. 214–5):
To ascertain a hypothetical frequency with certainty we would need to observe an
infinite number of trials. Assuming that a specific sequence of observations will con-
verge to a limiting relative frequency, there is no guarantee that it will do so within
the number of trials that will be observed. And if a relative frequency appears to have
converged in a finite number of trials, it is always possible that the relative frequency
diverges from this value in subsequent trials. These points are direct consequences of
the mathematics of infinite sequences. The task for the frequentist is to justify infer-
ring a (frequentist) probability from a relative frequency observed in a finite number
of trials, and there is no deductively valid way to do this. (La Caze, 2016, p. 353)
The argument amounts to the correct observation that we cannot figure out the true probability (as
a hypothetical frequency) by observing finite frequencies. This objection is particularly damaging
to von Mises and Reichenbach because they defined the probabilities in the spirit of logical empiri-
cism based on obersvation. The only means that they had to reach the hypothetical frequencies is
by means of observable finite frequencies. In order to mitigate this problem, von Mises introduced
two principles (Rowbottom, 2015, p. 100–1):
1. Law of Stability: The relative frequencies of attributes in collectives become increasingly
stable as observations increase.
2. Law of Randomness: Collectives involve random sequences, in the sense that they contain
no predictable patterns of attributes.
These laws are arguably ad hoc in von Mises theory, but at least they may be justified by induction.
Similarly to von Mises, Reichenbach (1949/1971) bridged the gap between finite and infinite
sequences by induction; Reichenbach called his law the Rule of Induction by Enumeration. Starting
with an infinite sequence of events A, we are interested in the relative frequency that some feature
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B occurs in this sequence. We can only observe a finite sequence of events of length n, for example.
The frequency of feature B among the first n members of A is, say, Fn(A,B) = m/n. In order
to infer the limiting frequency, the Rule of Induction by Enumeration needs to be applied: Given
Fn(A,B) = m/n, to infer that lim
n→∞
Fn(A,B) = m/n (Salmon, 1966, pp. 85–6).
La Caze, on the other hand, demands a deductive way to get to the hypothetical frequencies, and
this can be, in principle, accomplished by typicality frequentism, as the hypothetical frequencies are
predictions of the laws of physics about typical behavior. By applying a physical theory, probably
by building a model as is standard in many cases (Cartwright, 1983; Morgan and Morrison, 1999;
Giere, 2004), the probabilities fall out of the theory as any other empirical prediction. This move
was not possible for von Mises and Reichenbach, as they based their probabilities on observable
behavior of the physical processes. Typicality frequentism adheres to Salmon’s requirement for
solving the problem of ascertainability, because we can access the information of a physical theory
in principle; in practice, there might be strong limitations on how to access all this information, but
these obstacles are not of a different nature than we normally encounter in other kinds of empirical
predictions.
One may argue that the “in principle” in typicality frequentism does a lot of work.15 If we
have a powerful enough physical theory that also makes it easy to extract empirical predictions,
then we would be able to solve the problem of ascertainability. But what if we cannot extract this
information from a physical theory (for whatever reason)? Then either we need to extract the right
frequencies from observations, or we need to apply further metaphysical or physical assumptions.
Both paths are problematic: the first because we would fall back to the (empirical) problem of
hypothetical frequentism, the second because further theoretical assumptions need to be justified.
I grant that this is argument poses a challenge to the epistemology of typicality frequentism, that
is, how to ascertain the probabilities in practice. It is in general very hard, and mostly impossible,
to extract precise empirical information from a physical theory for sufficiently complex systems—
we cannot even analytically solve the three-body problem in classical physics. Therefore, for
practical purposes we rely on other means to make empirical predictions: for example, by making
certain idealizations and approximations. In the case of probabilities, we may need to rely on past
incomplete empirical observations for future predictions, or we may use theoretical assumptions,
like symmetry arguments (Zabell, 2016a).
3.3.3 The Reference Class Problem
The reference class problem is generally regarded to sound another death knell to frequentism
(Hájek, 2009, pp. 219), although it was originally raised by frequentists, like Venn (1888) and
Reichenbach (1949/1971), against single-case probabilities:
If we are asked to find the probability holding for an individual future event, we must
first incorporate the case in a suitable reference class. An individual thing or event may
be incorporated in many reference classes, from which different probabilities will re-
15Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
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sult. This ambiguity has been called the problem of the reference class. (Reichenbach,
1949/1971, p. 374)
The reference class problem for single-case probabilities is a problem of how to get the probability
of one event when it can be part of many collections. Venn’s example is the single-case probability
of a man called John Smith, aged 50, to die at age 61. In order to make a qualified prediction of
Smith’s life in the future eleven years, one needs to compare Smith with other people similar to
Smith. In order to extract single-case probabilities from frequentism, one would need to find a set
of people similar to Smith and who live until 61 and compare this number with all the people of
this age. The problem is, however, that it is not clear which properties the reference class, that
is, the people similar to Smith, need to have in order to count as ”similar to Smith,” (also because
Smith himself has so many different properties).
This example can be transferred into a reference class problem for frequentism in general (La Caze,
2016, section 16.4.4); we just need to add to John Smith any finite number of people of the same
age and ask about the probability of their life expectancy until age 61. What is the correct infinite
collection of people that give rise to the right probability? More precisely, given a finite sequence
of events (x1, . . . , xn), what is the appropriate infinite sequence (y1, y2, . . . ) that we shall asso-





i=1 yi for some feature of
(x1, . . . , xn)?
Furthermore, having found a suitable (or even the “correct’?) reference class, the order of the
members of the reference class may change the probability, and there may be even an ordering
where the sequence does not converge and no probability can be assigned in the first place. Hájek
(2007, p. 567) calls this subcategory of the reference class problem the reference sequence problem.
Von Mises dealt with the reference sequence problem by restricting the admissible sequences to
give a unique ordering; these sequences, he called collectives, and they are defined by means of
his two laws of probability, the law of stability and the law of randomness. With this move, von
Mises could only solve, or propose a solution to, one aspect of the reference class problem, namely,
what Hájek (2007, p. 565 ) calls the metaphysical reference class problem. Given the two laws of
probability, there is (hopefully) a fact what the correct reference class is and what accordingly the
probability is. Still, this information may be practically inaccessible for an agent, which amounts
to an epistemological reference class problem.
Does the reference class problem only arise in frequentist interpretations of probabilities? Hájek
(2007) argues that basically all interpretations of probability face their version of the reference class
problem, and the best we can hope for is to solve the metaphysical problem—the epistemological
problem will always remain. And theories that do not face a reference class problem in the first
place, like radical subjectivists à la de Finetti or certain versions of the propensity interpretation,
are, according to Hájek, no-theory theories of probability, because they do not sufficiently specify
what probabilities are and how they are to be used to guide agents’ beliefs and actions.
Typicality frequentism indeed solves the metaphysical reference class problem by means of a
physical theory, something Salmon also mentioned as a way out:
When a sequence is generated by a physical process that is well understood in terms
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of accepted physical theory, we may be able to make theoretical inferences concerning
convergence properties. For instance, our present knowledge of mechanics enables us
to infer the frequency behavior of many kinds of gambling mechanisms. Our theory
of probability must allow room for inferences of this kind. The basic problem, how-
ever, concerns sequences of events for which we are lacking such physical knowledge.
(Salmon, 1966, p. 84)
The Theory of Everything ultimately determines the underlying physical processes of a random
sequence, and thus determines the limit of a finite sequence if one were to repeat it infinitely.
The reference class problem is solved in typicality frequentism, because the reference class is the
finite sequence itself which gets extrapolated into an infinite sequence by means of the Theory of
Everything. Since we do not yet have a Theory of Everything, any candidate for a fundamental
physical theory determines the behavior of the reference class. In other words, the truthmaker for
singling out the reference class and the corresponding behavior is the Theory of Everything, and
for the current situation we can replace the Theory of Everything by an appropriate candidate for
a fundamental physical theory or by a model of the physical theory (given certain idealizations).
So the gap in Reichenbach’s Rule of Induction by Enumeration is closed not by induction from the
observable sequence itself, but by a physical theory describing the physical processes underlying
the sequence.
In a similar vein, the reference sequence problem is tackled. Intricate orderings that yield dif-
ferent limits or no limit at all are physically possible but atypical, given the initial conditions of
the universe, which determine the physical conditions of the physical processes governing the se-
quence.16 More precisely, there is a physically distinguished “natural” ordering of the sequence,
namely, the temporal ordering as determined or predicted by physics. Rowbottom (2015, p. 111)
presents an argument that physics is not able to single out a natural order for sequences , because,
according to special relativity, the order of, say, coin flips depends on the state of motion of an
observer. So two observers on two different trajectories may disagree on the order of the same coin
flips that they observe. But this would be only correct when the observers would see two different
sequences of coin flips that are space-like separated. If Rowbottom refers to one sequence of coin
flips, and I assume he does because this is the relevant case at issue, then the coin flips are time-like
separated, and, according to special relativity, the temporal order of time-like separated events are
objective, that is, independent of the state of motion of observers.
3.3.4 Frequentism Is Not Completely Objective
Von Mises (1928/1957, p. 14) makes a strong assertion about frequentistic probabilities when he
says, ”The probability of a 6 is a physical property of a given die and is a property analogous to
16Something similar has been proposed in certain versions of the propensity interpretation. Miller (1994, p. 56) says
that propensities are determined by “the complete situation of the universe (or the light-cone) at the time, and, for
Fetzer (1982, p. 195), they are determined by “a complete set of (nomically and/or causally) relevant conditions
[. . . ] which happens to be instantiated in that world at that time.” These solutions, however, are not satisfactory for
Hájek (2007, p. 576) because the propensities, such defined, are not accessible to an agent to assign probabilities in
practice. Therefore, he subsumes these proposals under no-theory theories of probabilities.
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its mass, specific heat, or electrical resistance.” I agree with La Caze (2016, section 16.4.5) that
frequentism does not oblige upon us this strong metaphysical interpretation of probabilities, but I
disagree that frequentistic probabilities are not objective. For La Caze, “[h]ypothetical frequencies
are not divorced from consideration of personal factors (including beliefs).”
His argument goes like this. Since the main advantage proclaimed of frequentism is that it intro-
duces objective probabilities, any subjective trace in frequentistic probabilities would undermine
the entire project. The subjectivity that frequentism relies on comes from how the particular physi-
cal process that gives rise to frequencies is modeled. The probabilities for a coin toss, for example,
depend on how the properties of the coin and the tossing mechanism are modeled. That some par-
ticular physical model is suitable for giving rise to the proper frequencies needs to be judged by an
agent. And this judgement is unequivocally subjective, as La Caze (2016, p. 358) says, “Scientists
employing frequentists probabilities need to make a judgement that the data-generating processes
providing the measured outcomes of the study are adequately modeled by one or more of these ap-
proaches to specifying the requirements on the expected sequence of outcomes.” The bar raised by
this requirement is so high that basically all our physical predictions are deemed to be subjective,
because they depend on certain idealizations to be made by an agent. The practice of physics has
for practical matters this “subjective” ingredient but it does not make physics a subjective science.
Therefore, I do not see that frequentistic probabilities are less objective than other predictions of
physics.
Hájek (2009, pp. 215–7) also criticizes the idealizations made in hypothetical frequentism, but
he approaches this problem from a different direction:
Consider the coin toss. We are supposed to imagine infinitely many results of tossing
the coin: that is, a world in which coins are ‘immortal’, lasting forever, coin-tossers are
immortal and never tire of tossing (or something similar anyway), or else in which coin
tosses can be completed in ever shorter intervals of time... In short, we are supposed
to imagine utterly bizarre worlds [. . . ]. (Hájek, 2009, pp. 215–6)
For Hájek, the problem of hypothetical frequentism lies in the definition of probabilities: in or-
der to define hypothetical frequencies “utterly bizarre” counterfactual scenarios need to be set up
that “would have to be very different from the actual world” (Hájek, 2009, pp. 215). I think this
problem can be remedied by a physical theory and the laws of nature in such a theory. We know
that laws of nature ground facts beyond the actual regularities (e.g., Maudlin, 2007b). The coun-
terfactual idealizations that need to be made for hypothetical frequentism—and also for typicality
frequentism—may be more radical or more detached from the actual world than in other applica-
tions, like in the normal way of model building (Morgan and Morrison, 1999), but they can be still
grounded and made true by the laws in a physical theory.
3.4 Objections and Replies
1. Typicality seems to be too vague. How can it be meaningful?
Typicality is intentionally a vague term. Not all notions need to be precise to be meaningful.
We know when someone is tall or when someone is bald. Of course, there may be borderline
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cases when we may debate is this person really tall or really bald, but for all practical pur-
poses there is no ambiguity. The same we encounter in physics. The initial macrostate the
universe evolved from according to statistical mechanics is also vague, because the bound-
aries are fuzzy and not precisely specified. But when we reason about the evolution of the
universe we talk about microstates that do not lie on the boundary, so this vagueness is harm-
less. It is a strength of the notion of typicality to be vague, because we don’t need to cope
with unnecessary details in our explanation and we can use typicality in many different areas.
2. What is a formal definition of typicality?
In many cases, typicality does not need a formal definition. It is basically a technical term for
most or almost all. Maudlin (2018) and Wilhelm (2019) propose two different approaches
to formalize typicality. Maudlin interprets typicality as a second-order predicate, that is,
a predicate of a predicate. We formally write F (X) symbolizing that X has property F .
Typicality would be a further qualification between X and F . T (F,X) would symbolize
that it is typical for X to have F . One may even consider typicality as another quantifier.
Wilhelm, on the other hand, focuses on the explanatory scheme of typicality explanations
and points out that it resembles Hempel’s deductive–nomological model.
3. What is the relationship between a probability measure and a typicality measure?
Mathematically, a typicality measure is usually represented as a probability measure, but a
probability measure contains more information than is actually needed:
While typicality is usually defined – as it was here – in terms of a probability
measure, the basic concept is not genuinely probabilistic, but rather a less detailed
concept. A measure µ of typicality need not be countably additive, nor even
finitely additive. Moreover, for any eventE, if µ is merely a measure of typicality,
there is no point worrying about, nor any sense to, the question as to the real
meaning of say ‘µ(E) = 1/2‘. Distinctions such as between ‘µ(E) = 1/2‘ and
‘µ(E) = 3/4‘ are distinctions without a difference.
The only thing that matters for a measure µ of typicality is ‘µ(E)  1´: a mea-
sure of typicality plays solely the role of informing us when a set E of exceptions
is sufficiently small that we may in effect ignore it and regard the phenomenon in
question occurring of the set E, as having been explained. (Goldstein, 2001, p.
15)
4. What is the difference between typicality and probability? Is typical just another word for
highly probable and atypical for highly improbable?
Historically typicality evolved from abstracting from highly probable cases. Boltzmann, for
example, said that the second law of thermodynamics makes it highly probable that a gas in a
box equilibrates. But I think that typicality is a more primitive notion than and different from
probability, and this paper showed how one can reduce probabilities to typicality. Typicality
is a much less-fine grained and more general concept than probability.
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5. There are cases where something typical is highly improbable. For example, a long, well-
mixed sequence of heads is typical but improbable, e.g. HTHTTHHHTTTHTHHT. Or a very
specific event may be typical but improbable, e.g. the probability of randomly selecting from
the US population a man of height exactly 175.4 cm is very low, even though this is the
average height, and in a good sense typical. How can one reconcile that?17
The difference between typicality and probability have been addressed in more detail in
Wilhelm (2019). Typicality is not a categorical property. So it doesn’t make sense to say that
something is typical by itself. There needs to be always a reference: “typical with respect
to what?” It is typical for clovers to have three leaves, because in the class of all clovers
most of them have three leaves. If we zoom in too much, for instance, when comparing the
particular shapes of the leaves, every leaf may be unique, and we may not be able to find any
“typical shape”. Applied to the coin toss, if we zoom in the particular pattern of a series of
tosses, and ask, “Is HTHTTHHHTTTHTHHT typical?”. The right answer is, “Typical with
respect to what?” Typical with respect to the number of heads and tails. Then yes, because
approximately 50% are heads and tails (I ignore that the series needs to be much longer to
make such a statement). But what about the particular pattern HTHTTHHHTTTHTHHT? It
is very unlikely to repeat this particular pattern in an actual coin toss. But this is the case for
any particular pattern. The same is true in statistical mechanics: every particular trajectory
in phase space has measure zero and is therefore very unlikely (or atypical, although it is
meaningless to talk about atypicality per se too). This point has been raised against typicality
by Uffink (2007), and I think it has been rightly answered by Lazarovici and Reichert (2015,
section 5.2). I agree on the example of the height, which is similar to the way I define
probabilities. The actual height 175.4 cm is rarely found in a person but most people are
close to the average.
6. If you reduce probabilities to typical longterm frequencies, then you cannot account for all
the uses of probability. Especially single-case probabilities lack an explanation.
That is correct, but I claim that single-case probabilities are not meaningfully interpreted as
some kind of frequency. They may be properly construed as purely subjective degrees of
belief, as a kind of tool in Bayesian updating, but not in an ontological sense. Therefore, I
endorse a pluralistic account of probabilities tailored to different applications.
4 Conclusion
If our world is correctly described by a deterministic physical theory, then every event is deter-
mined by the initial conditions of the universe. Typicality frequentism builds on this insight and
singles out physical processes that give rise to stable long-term frequencies. If these frequencies are
typical they define probabilities. As I have shown, the essential idea behind this approach comes
from how Boltzmann explained the thermodynamic arrow of time and how he reduced thermo-
dynamics to statistical mechanics. The main advantage I see with typicality frequentism is that it
17Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this issue, who I quote almost verbatim.
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carves objective probabilities at the right joint by specifying those kinds of probabilities that are
meaningful within physics. In this way, typicality frequentism does not face the same problems as
traditional empiricist accounts of frequentism do. Other applications of probability beyond physics
may be properly described by subjective approaches that would complement to a pluralistic picture
of probabilities.
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